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INTRODUCTION
How did the conceptual structures of western capitalist democracies develop? Cultural studies offer fruitful historical engagements with this question, often through interdisciplinary studies of such myriad concepts as privacy, natural order, contract, or romantic love, and their evolving meanings.
Studies of law within this framework are substantively interesting and theoretically liberating for "law and…" scholarship. The limits implicit in a conceptual focus on any one relationality: law and architecture, law and economics, law and literature, etc., are opened up and nuanced through a historically contingent relationality pertaining to specific ideas, ideologies, or concepts.
But history too emerges in conceptual relationships. In law and literature, historical analyses frequently fall into a polarized framework. At one pole, law and literature appear as mutually supportive hegemonic discourses. At the other, law is hegemonic while literature is counter-hegemonic, and, along the same lines, law is associated with rule, formality, reason, and self-interest, while literature enables pluralism, equity, emotion, and empathy. 1 Both poles serve critical projects within legal studies; both are situated within and substantiated by cultural theory. Yet, the polarized framework is often self-defeating in terms of historical understanding, and in terms of the critical impulse. Neither pole is sufficient in itself, yet to keep both in view each must be modified.
I use the lens of liberalism-critique to make a case for an alternative framework for interdisciplinary discourse analysis in law and literature. To do so, I examine the construction of a basic tenet of nineteenth-century classical liberalism -separate spheres, in two central sites of the era -classical contract law and realist novels.
The argument is simple. Nineteenth-century law and literature construed spheres differently. In particular, their idea of the economic sphere differed in important ways. But, the differences do not fall along the separating lines of hegemony/counter-hegemony, reason/emotion and so forth. The differences do not fall along these lines because there was a common streak shared by nineteenth-century law and literature which was no less important than difference: both responded to joint liberal anxieties, particularly to the need to make sense of, and represent, the capitalist division of labor. Novels and law were both liberal, but differently liberal.
I am thus going to work within a tension: on the one hand, identify commonalities between law and literature which are historically significant -in line with the commitment of cultural studies to trace "unconscious mechanisms that underlie [] central solidarities" 2 ; on the other hand, insist on differences which are discourse-specific, and so, in Clifford Geertz's words, engage in "the management of difference." 
I. SEPARATE SPHERES AND THE MARKET
During the course of the eighteenth century, recounts Mary Poovey, emergent domains, like the economic, were gradually specified as separate from residual domains, like the political, the theological, and the ethical. These emergent domains did not immediately replace their predecessors, however, but were mapped onto them in a process that entailed the negotiation and eventual redrawing of the boundaries between kinds of knowledge, kinds of practice, and kinds of institutions.
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As Poovey's account suggests, separate spheres denote a compartmentalized view of the world, a separation of "forms of human association" 6 and more generally human experience into identifiable areas answering to distinct logics and exemplifying typical patterns of relations. Most familiarly, a separate-spheres view entails a distinction between state, or politics, and civil society -that is, "public" and "private" life. Within the private sphere, a second separation is between the economy, or market, and family life (often, and confusingly, discussed through public (market) and private (home)).
Historians of late western modernity, particularly feminists and market critics, have long attended to separate spheres both as ideology -as a basic tenet of liberal thought, and as a sociological reality -as a structural element of the capitalist social order. Max Weber famously
propounded an understanding of the rise of capitalism as an evolutionary story of separation between family and economic activity. 7 The story, with a controversial starting point periodized to various eras from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries, 8 describes the shedding of obligations standing in the way of rationalization. Zygmunt Bauman recounts the basic plotline:
The rise of modern society was a "melting of solids." The dense tissue of social obligations was undone, leaving "the whole complex network of social relations unstuck." In this process, the economy was progressively untied from its traditional political, ethical and cultural entanglements.
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Feminist histories often offer similar accounts while emphasizing the emerging role of the family sphere to which women were largely confined, construed in opposition to the economic. The story recounts a sharp dichotomy reaching its zenith in the nineteenth century between the feminine home and the male workaday world. The separated spheres were defined one against the other, with the home assuming significance for its difference from, and compensation for, the market, and vice versa.
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The separation of spheres within civil society, variously formulated as market versus home, economy versus family, exchange versus gift, and so forth, imports with it a basic contrast in both norms of conduct and structure: rational, calculative, self-interested action, based on abstract freedom and formal equality in the former, are contrasted with altruistic, fluid, compassionate action in an often more dependent and hierarchical context, in the latter.
The story of the separation of spheres has been criticized for its descriptive limitations.
Addressing the economic sphere, Marcel Mauss criticized the modern western conception of economic exchange based on material utility with evidence from "archaic" societies. In those societies, he argued, the modern conception is nowhere to be found, and the concepts that "it pleases us to contrast," like liberty and obligation, generosity and self-interest, are in one melting pot. Modern society too is not as rational as it imagines, Mauss suggested; we too would do well to put our concepts back into the melting pot. 11 Poovey likewise addresses the complexities of the disaggregation of spheres. The negotiation of sphere boundaries, she argues, was full of fissures which resulted not only from the uneven relationship between discourse and institutional practice, but also from the historical indebtedness of spheres to older ones from which they emerge.
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The following two Parts consider conceptualizations of sphere-separations in contract law and novels of the nineteenth century. Read together, the account traces divergences between discursive constructions of spheres. It thus offers a critique of the historical story of separations, not simply as a sociological reality, but as ideology as well. Classical liberalism did not entail a single version of the separation and meaning of spheres, or a single version of the market.
Classical liberalism, as a set of ideas accommodative of a capitalistic market-based order, could be read in more than one way, ascribe meaning in more than one way, understand, naturalize, and structure the multiple phenomena of market society in more than one way.
Today's literature on liberalism should allow readers to quickly appreciate the argument.
The last three or four decades have seen mounting literature departing from familiar accounts of sphere separations. Accounts in various disciplines have underlined relational autonomy, the centrality of interdependence in conceptualizations of modern economic life, and the complexities of any account of consent emerging from the embeddedness of practice and utterance in social contexts. Thus, the complexities in liberalism explored in this paper today should fall on fertile grounds. Concurrently, today's literature on "varieties of capitalism" addresses multiplicity at the level of material reality which leaves no room for monolithic ideological accounts; varieties of capitalism, note, are also acknowledged historically. 13 Yet, all of this seems to have little operative relevance in discussions of Victorian liberalism. The richness of literature on liberalism today is conceptualized as a late historical critique of an earlier and almost undisputed hegemonic construct. Present and historical capitalisms do not seem to complicate the historical picture either, perhaps because within units considered single economies and cultures  like states, any diversity is reduced to a "for" and "against" formulation. This paper suggests, however, that -for‖ and -against‖ accounts of liberal ideology are no more convincing historically than they are at present days. Liberal ideology should be disessentialized in historical terms, and law's and literature's positions reconsidered.
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II. CONTRACT LAW 15 AND THE MARKET
Classical contract discourse of the nineteenth century -the bedrock of modern contract, and the heart of private common law, construed sphere separations on two levels. First, classical discourse relied on a distinction between politics and civil society as two separate spheres of action. The distinction was based upon a clear division between public and private sources of law-making. On a second level, contract discourse construed separations within civil society, between market and non-market (yet "private") forms of association: classical contract discourse assumed and reinforced an existence separated into two opposing yet mutually dependent halves -a contractual sphere of trade grounded in socially-disembedded economic self-interest, and an area of family and friendship beyond the reach of contract. Contract law was the law of the market.
How did contract law generate the separation of spheres? The following discussion explains the broad conceptual structures of classical contract discourse which grounded sphere separations, and then discusses one specific, problematic, and especially revealing aspect of contract thinking: the promise of marriage.
A. The Conceptual Structures of Classical Contract Discourse
Conceptually, the theory of contract was centered on a view of contract as an expression of individual will, as opposed to the will of the community.
"As every contract derives its effect from the intention of the parties, that intention, as expressed, or inferred, must be the ground of every decision respecting its operation and extent, and the grand object of consideration in every question with regard to its construction." 16 Such was Pothier's classical formulation of the will theory of contract, the basis of the common-law formulation. 17 The core of contract law was organized by legal thinkers, explains Duncan Kennedy, to reflect a set of ideals associated with the distinction between private and public will, between individual and community: facilitation -as opposed to regulation, self-determinationas opposed to paternalism, autonomy -as opposed to community, and formality -as opposed to informality. All of these served to construe the market logic, and its counter-images.
In the organization of contract rules, classical thinkers had to deal with many contract rules that reflected regulation, paternalism, community and informality. Two doctrinal developments solved the difficulty: the rejection of the ideas of "status," "relation" and "condition" as operative sources of the great mass of contract rules -as they had been in earlier eras, and the emergence of a specialized law of persons, and of a new category of status, which grouped together and explained the peculiar character of rules incompatible with the new vision of the nature of "real" contracts. 18 The distinction between private and public sources of obligations -between contract and status, was importantly grounded in the centerpiece of contract law -the doctrine of consideration. The basic question raised by the doctrine was deceptively simple: what promises will the law of contract enforce? Whatever the answers were, argues Roy Kreitner, the very question had already succeeded in achieving a crucial conceptual goal: Promise -understood as an individually-created, self-imposed obligation -became the sole source of contractual duties. 19 The realm of exchange was the realm of individual action, from which the community was excluded.
Another important feature of classical contract was its attention to the formation of contract over its content. The role of contract law in its classical version was to ensure it enforced free transactions, not police their content. Rules of formation thus developed in the nineteenth century, becoming more and more intricate, and judicial review of contractual content tended to be explained through them. This attention, argues Kreitner, obscured the role of societallyimposed obligations in contractual contexts in favor of individually-chosen obligations. 20 Additional features of contract thinking added a second crucial layer to the market image of contract law, rendering contractual individual action not just private, but rational. One such feature is the distinction between contract and gift, with gift (or, at the classical period, any unbargained-for promise), like status, left outside the contractual boundary. While the nonenforcement of gratuitous promises had a long history in case law, classical thinkers turned it into "the cornerstone of the contractual edifice." The boundary line traced the lines of rationality: unreciprocated transfers raise the spectre of economically irrational social transactions which the legal vision of the market denied. 21 Another formulation of the manner in which contract discourse generated separate spheres is the opposition between what Roberto Unger calls principles and counterprinciples.
Classical contract doctrine expressed as one of its dominant principles the freedom to contract, or to choose one's contractual partners. Doctrinal developments that undermined freedom to contract in order to protect communal aspects of social life were counterprinciples. Their effect was to limit the application of freedom to contract in areas in which more complex textures of reciprocity and dependence required protection. 22 The principles and the counterprinciples, then, relate to background assumptions about different kinds of human association, the former acknowledging nothing but self-interest, the latter taking into account reciprocal loyalty, support and dependence. Counterprinciples were understood precisely in their oppositional stance to principles, and were formulated as mere ad hoc qualifications to them; they were not allowed to undermine the basic conceptual structure expressed in the dominant principles, but rather worked from the outside, as it were, to limit their application. Maintaining the dominance of principles as the essence of contract and treating the areas subjected to counterprinciples as anomalies or somehow less contractual, grounded the idea of different models of association for different spheres of life; they reinforced the distinction between the market and the sphere of family and friendship.
The analytical distinction in legal discourse between societally-and individually-imposed obligations, between dependence and self-interest -between status and contract, gained impetus from its convergence with a wider political implication: contract's meaning as "not status" was part of Victorians' understanding of their historical moment; of the search for an alternative system to traditional hierarchies which would move individuals from subjection to freedom. 23 Maine's famed proposition on historical progress from status to contract created something like a frame, placing contract squarely within the structure of nineteenth-century society. Over and above any analytical meaning in his formulation, Maine used contract as a proxy for the refined (and progressive) essence of nineteenth-century social reality of industrialization and the market. 24 As Dicey explained, the substitution of relations founded on contract for relations founded on status was for individualists generally the readiest mode of abolishing a whole body of antiquated institutions. 25 Contract, as the par-excellence tool of the market, represented a set of freely chosen, self-imposed obligations of formally equal individuals, unlike status, representing obligations imposed without an individual's consent, tied instead to a dependant social position
The conceptual process in contract thought is described by Kennedy as a double movement, subtracting relations from the picture, then abstracting to find individual will as the essence of what remained. 26 The specific formulation of "free will" which remained at the core of contract after subtraction and abstraction suffered from apparent logical inconsistencies explicable by the model's version of the market as a realm of competitive economic rationality. Consider "free": the will theory received its impetus from the ideal of freedom; the scope of contract was the scope of freedom for individual self-determination. The classical notion that contract law embodies freedom was intertwined, however, with the ideal type of the market economy, for it is the state of perfect competition which protects parties from arbitrary power in one another. 27 In any condition of less than perfect competition, individuals are not perfectly free, not even within the limited concept of negative freedom. The enforcement of contract was another aspect of diminished rather than enhanced freedom, a point suppressed under the need to secure market transactions. 28 Now consider "will." Despite the focus on individual will, the model did not attempt to pinpoint the subjective will of the parties. Instead, classical contract law adopted objectivism, imputing liability on the basis of objectively-determined manifestations of intention. While, at first glance, objectivism appears puzzling, departing from the proclaimed commitment to the parties' will and offering instead a measure of protecting reliance, objectivism was consistent with the conceptual investment in a vision of the market sphere: it was part of contract's formality, and contributed to the tendencies of abstractionism -or reluctance to concretize and bring into view the social contexts of rational market actors, and the absoluteness of contractual rights, supporting contract's compatibility with market prudence.
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B. The Promise of Marriage and Separate Spheres
The promise of marriage is a borderline area, a difficult and hardly paradigmatic aspect of contractual thinking. Dealing with difficult cases, which threaten the outlook grounded in legal discourse, is helpful for two reasons. First, the core claim -contract law's commitment to separate spheres, becomes clearer through the estranging effect of a liminal case. Second, such cases serve as a reminder that legal discourse was not free from complexities and contradictions; I
trace dominant visions in law, and in the next Part -in novels, without claiming exclusivity or full coherence for either. I will therefore repeat the same exercise -an analysis of an internal contradiction, with respect to novels as well.
* * * By the time civil marriage was made universal in mid-nineteenth century -apparently a step toward contractualism, the view of marriage as contract depended on the nominally consensual aspect involved in choosing a spouse or agreeing to marry. Other than this aspect, from early nineteenth century the incidents of marriage were largely prescribed by the state. 30 Coverture meant the legal death of married women as contracting parties, itself a doctrine in stark opposition to the idea of the marriage relation as contract. 31 Accordingly, classical writers excluded marriage from their treatises on the law of contract, defining it as status. 32 As a matter of public debate, the contractual view of marriage was up against a concurrence between the Christian emphasis on marriage's sacramental quality which united man and woman into one person, and separate-spheres ideology which combined a denial of gender equality and a concern about the ruthless world of the market from which one had to find shield and at the same time protect the family. 33 Marriage's exclusion from contract law was thus part of contract's alliance with a separate-spheres outlook.
The promise of marriage, by contrast, was encompassed under general contract law.
Historians disagree on the importance of the contractual framework for the action for breach of promise. Some, like Patrick Atiyah, view it as significant, a telling sign of the triumph of the classical model of contract. 34 Susie Steinbach argues that the promise of marriage, its rise and fall, can make little sense outside the contractual ideology of contract. 35 Others, like Ginger Frost and Saskia Lettmaier, view status-based questions of class and gender as paramount here, and tend to dismiss the contractual framing as thin cover, if not total misfit, little helpful in explicating the fortunes of the promise of marriage.
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The promise of marriage was indeed a conceptually difficult area for contract discourse, and not only because it complicated abstractions usually applied to market contexts. The inherent contradiction between the will -which was here linked with the ideal of unencumbered loveand the coercion involved in holding promisors to their promises was particularly difficult to square at the rhetorical level. In terms of contract discourse, the promise of marriage is thus an easy target for critique.
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And yet, the promise of marriage is not simply a site which undermines the discourse's framework. Despite its problematics, there is a conspicuous point which illuminates law's commitment to separate spheres. The point is precisely the dividing line between contract and non-contract: the distinction between betrothal and marriage. Contractual rights generated by the promise of marriage applied to the period of betrothal; the action for breach of promise of marriage reinforced the fact exemplified in the legal structure of marriage itself: contract stopped at the threshold of the family.
Why stop after betrothal and not before? Why enter this conceptually difficult zone?
Perhaps this point too can be answered within the same framework. The search for a husband was for Victorian women their most important, and often exclusive, economic career, and the period of betrothal represented the highest point of risky investment. 38 Economic hazards to women from broken engagements lay at the basis of the action for breach of promise; these economic meanings were closely, and perhaps not merely coincidentally, linked with the classical view of contract. In enforcing promises of marriage within the framework of general contract, law recognized women as economic agents, if for a limited scope and purpose, perhaps even the counterintuitive purpose of moving women into coverture, and reinforcing their dependent nature.
We see here a complex phenomenon: contract thought observed a fragile line between the imperialistic tendency of the will theory to bring under its wings a wide variety of abstracted relationships, and separate-spheres outlook which required that only relationships answering to market rationality would enter the contractual zone. The prolonged controversy over the action for breach of promise clarifies how nontrivial the line indeed was, with opponents voicing the intuition that the contractual framework was inappropriate for the familial context of marriage promises.
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In the distinction between the promise of marriage and marriage itself the two levels of separation of spheres converged: the separation between the family (marriage) and the market (promise of marriage) became a reflection of the separation between the state (marriage as status) and civil society (promise of marriage as contract).
* * * Contract discourse substantiated a rigorous version of the separation of spheres. The first level of separation -that between public and private spheres, created the market as a free realm. The second level of the separation of spheres -that between market and non-market private relationships, injected specific content into market interaction. Having marginalized relations which were not individually chosen and shaped, contract law decentered relations not adhering to a strict rationality and rigid allocation of rights and duties, constituting the market as a competition among rational economic agents who owe one another nothing beyond their chosen contracts.
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III. NOVELS AND THE MARKET
"The society and the novels -our general names for those myriad and related primary activitiescame from a pressing and varied experience which was not yet history; which had no new forms, no significant moments, until these were made and given by direct human actions." Specific arguments on novels' relation to separate-spheres thinking likewise abound.
Catherine Gallagher, for example, argues that the association of public and private in realist novels depends on an underlying assumption that the two are separate. 44 Franco Moretti, to take another example, reads links between professional and family life established in George Eliot's Middlemarch (discussed below) as confirming the Weberian paradigm which opposes "vocation" as a depersonalized sphere to "everyday life", maintaining that one must be sacrificed to the other. 45 And there are, of course, readings pointing the other way, those questioning novels' commitment to the separation of spheres. 46 How do these readings hold when examined against contract law's version of separate
spheres? To what extent does the construction of market, of economic rationality and trade in novels share the same consciousness of human experience found in legal discourse? The question seems worth asking not least because novels, like law, were virtually obsessed with the new world of commerce, identifying contract as a human endeavor central to their emergent society.
Contract was for novels, no less than law, a conceptual tool for delineating social relations as historical frameworks responsible for that task -feudalism, religion -wore down. Stories of promises, debts, and exchanges of all sorts pervade novelistic pages, functioning as both frames and content for representations of economic relations. Augustus Melmotte, Trollope's deservedly-famed corrupt financier, thus decides to make a speech at his first appearance in the House of Commons, the highest point of his career. The attempt ends embarrassingly. Melmotte's courage slips away under the intimidating presence of statesmen and House members; he is further cowed when corrected with regard to formal forms of address in the House, and loses the gist of his argument.
A. The Single Arena
The episode captures the inability of an economic concept to enter social interaction in pure form. What begins as a supposed "error in finance," attributable to no one but "commercial gentlemen" subject to their specialized "crazes" (530), ends in the complex space figured in the representative system of parliament. Here the pure concept becomes something worth talking about because it interacts with those subject to other crazes, with social injuries, with social hierarchy and with social rules of conduct. While the content of the pure financial argument is lost, its meaning is established. We have here an almost physical image of a concept moving from the land of ideas to the land of social people, and changing its basic quality as it does.
* * * This Part exemplifies how Victorian novels represent commercial activity and economic contexts, establishing their importance precisely in the social forms they assume. "Single arena" is the term I use to explain these representations.
Single arena denotes a novelistic interpretive structure -a way to attribute significance.
Novels pull diverse strands of experience and activity: friendship and enmity, romance, family, commerce, religious practice, art, science, politics, and what not, and give them all meaningsignificance -as interdependent social transactions of insistently relational persons within a single social world construed by and in the novel. In pulling multiple strands together and understanding them as interdependent social transactions, novels undermine the notion of separate spheres answering to distinct logics. They replace the consciousness of discontinuity -of boundaries between the spheres which make up the social world, with a consciousness of continuity -of porous and incoherent boundaries between loosely differentiated spheres of activity which all succumb to a governing social logic.
The single arena implies that relationships in different spheres, like those in the family or the market, do not ultimately rely on different logics. In particular, the market rarely runs on economic motive alone. The overarching logic of spheres of human action, whatever their function, is the broad category of the social, in which persons act out their insistently social attributes. This point is represented not only in direct accounts of human motivations, but also formally. One aspect of the formal representation of the single arena is structural parallelisms between different spheres which work to underline a common social logic. Another formal representation is a juxtaposition of either similar economic positions only to treat them differently, or a juxtaposition of different economic positions only to treat them similarly, in both cases through some form of a social logic which governs in lieu of the economic.
The single arena also implies that spheres are not closed systems but interdependent ones.
Interdependence relies not simply on spheres' conceptual place as parts of a whole (a notion informing separate-spheres thinking in law), but on continual, mundane connections: on representations of minute and multiple causal chains cutting across sphere boundaries -to which I refer as floating causality. 48 As a result of the overarching social logic on which various spheres are run, and of the interdependence between spheres, the dividing lines between them are inherently blurry.
B. An Embedded Economy
The single arena is not a view we might label, perhaps sentimentally, premodern. Differentiations between spheres of human activity, both rhetorical and functional, are evident everywhere, hence single arena, not single sphere. Indeed, the social embeddedness of the economy in novels begins with the fact of differentiation.
[T]he curious double strands in Farfrae's thread of life -the commercial and the romantic -were very distinct at times. Like the colours in a variegated cord those contrasts could be seen intertwisted, yet not mingling (The Mayor of Casterbridge 183). Henchard's bankruptcy -part of the plot of Henchanrd's downfall, is one instance representing the distortions of a separate-spheres point of view. In the novel's bankruptcy scene creditors assess the situation. The bankruptcy, they all concede, was brought about by a rashness of dealing without bad intent; Henchard, they think, had been fair. Yet, bad intent was there.
There was bad intent directed towards Farfrae whom Henchard jealously sought to ruin until he himself was ruined. Henchard was also willing to cheat creditors: Rather than repay them by accepting a loan from his rich ex-lover Lucetta, Henchard asks her to pretend to be his fiancé and ease creditor pressure. Henchard will not take a business loan from a woman in a symbolic denial of the mixture between market and home, or male and female spheres, a denial which speaks foremost to its inversion: whether a woman enters the market formally as lender or remains put as wife-to-be, she is involved in the business. Henchard, as customary with him, chooses the wrong path and is unable to avoid bankruptcy. To understand the bankruptcy, however, his proceedings must be read contextually. Orphaned Ruth's guardian is the flourishing maltster of Skelton, a "sensible, hard-headed man of the world; having a very fair proportion of conscience as consciences go; indeed, perhaps more than many people; for he has some ideas of duty extending to the circle beyond his own family" (8). 51 When Ruth's father dies, the guardian is surprised at being appointed executor to a will and guardian to a girl he could not remember, but he "did not, as some would have done, decline acting altogether, but speedily summoned the creditors, examined into the accounts . . . and discharged all the debts," and, under the same sense of duty he paid about £80 into the Skelton bank for a week, while he inquired for a situation or apprenticeship of some kind for poor heart-broken Ruth; heard of Mrs
, arranged all with her in two short conversations; drove over for Ruth in his gig; waited while she and the old servant packed up her clothes, and grew very impatient while she ran, with her eyes streaming with tears, round the garden, tearing off in a passion of love whole boughs of favourite China and damask roses . . . (38).
Thus Ruth is placed in her new solitary life, from which the story of fall, and then martyrdom-like rise, flows.
The text points to a troubling parallelism between Ruth and her father's debts, both handled by the guardian using an efficient and emotionally impoverished standard. The episode is set up to clarify the origins and problematics of this standard.
The guardian's name is never mentioned, in line with his personal remoteness from the task. His sensibility implies impatience when one of his objects (accidentally, Ruth) exhibits emotional responses inconsistent with his idea of the job. His impatience is followed by his lectures on "economy and self-reliance" (38), from which Ruth is little able to "profit," being grief-stricken.
The story is amplified through formal presentation. The narrator describes the guardian's actions in one long sentence lumping together actions relating to assets, debts and a young person, and showing them all to be part of one to-do-list, satisfactorily performed. The part of the list dealing with Ruth begins with one clause between two semicolons: "; paid about £80 . . . while he inquired for a situation . . . for poor heart-broken Ruth;". In this single unit we see the same parallelism suggested by the whole structure: £80 in the bank are juxtaposed against Ruth in her despair. This is the only mention of an amount, boldly attaching monetary value to Ruth which defines her future options, and the rest of the novel.
The guardian episode consists of only two paragraphs, the first beginning with the creditors, and the second already continuing into the first night at the dressmaker's house. The mismatch between form and content: a brief episode and a huge crisis, textually performs Ruth's social neglect. This structure also creates a formal and technical connection between the debts (opening paragraph) and Ruth's personal fortunes (closing paragraph), duplicating the guardian's treatment.
The critique of commodification informing this episode is familiar enough. It enables
Ruth to seek "justice, tempered with mercy and considerations" (240) across spheres, commerce included. The underlying world view driving the critique, however, is perhaps less than obvious: The infamous Skimpole presents a process of increasing distance from material reality as a successful culmination: In a series of rigorous logical absurdities he suggests that in being required to repay debts he is asked for something which is really nothing (money as "bits of metal or thin paper"); he intends to give it, but he does not have it; and so he should be rationally lawsuit-proof (240-41). 53 A set of denials of the relation between representation and realitymoney representing real value, intention referring to real objects, rationality representing real people who want real things -points back to Skimpole's ego as a sole reality, leaving his multiple creditors empty-handed.
Mr George is praiseworthy for, despite similar failures to pay, he reverses Skimpole's abstractions. George's externality, contrasted to Skimpole's, indicates his hands-on approach:
George is in touch with life, his sunburnt face and arms having "been used to a pretty rough life"
(341), as the abstracted Skimpole is delicate and generally looks younger than his age (89); while Skimpole's movement is light and bright, George's "step too is measured and heavy" (341).
George is almost physically attached to the ground he walks, his immediate environment leaves physical marks on his body: a figurative image of near-reaching. Being an involved character,
George not only intends to pay, he ties (unseccussful) repayment to his personal efforts. The money he owes is likewise recognized as contextualized value: something that could make him "steady" in life; something that makes him fragile vis-à-vis his creditor Smallweed; something on which his guarantors' wellbeing depends.
Compare George's and Skimpole's representations as two poor debtors to the treatment of two different positions within contract: a poor debtor and a rich creditor. Here, despite obvious differences, we find a similar moral evaluation. George's lender -Smallweed, turns out to be analogous to Skimpole. While Skimpole rhetorically denies the value of the money he borrows, representing himself as having "no idea of money" (90), Smallweed denies the value of anything but the money he is owed -he never goes out nor occupies himself in any way, denying the value of literature, music or any other interest, in an apparent contradiction to the hedonistic artist To conclude this brief tour in novels, consider George Eliot's celebrated Middlemarch. 54 Individual protagonists in this novel repeatedly encounter a non-accommodating reality -both of other individuals and of communities, to which they unhappily adjust, a focus which has won woman, made vs. never made, reciprocated vs. unreciprocated, legally enforceabile vs.
unenforceable. However, joint significance is infused into these stories through the common function of the promises within the self/other, ideal/real tensions explored in the novel.
Representations of promissory relations allow, once more, a replacement of discontinuities and oppositions between spheres with continuities reliant on a governing social logic. The promises' joint significance renders the conceptual distinctions between them secondary in importance, not to say disinformative.
What to make, then, of claims to the contrary, like Moretti's argument about Middlemarch? 55 Both interpretive arguments -"single arena" and "separate spheres" -proceed from the observation that novels deal with a multiplicity of spheres which appear intertwined, open to multidirectional influence, and subject to common thematic concerns. In privileging the single-arena reading I insist that these representations of complexity, intertwining and interconnections, both in form and content, are part of the meaning of spheres in novels, rather than noise one can relegate to a peripheral position. It is precisely here that literary discourse actively and forcefully constructs a picture of human existence importantly different from the legal one, itself achieved with no little effort.
* * *
The single arena in the representation of economic relations achieves, in Jeffrey Franklin's terms, a subsumption of all spheres. 56 Novelistic representations of commerce, business, or the "economic," do not produce an ideologically oppositional space to the legal one. Instead, they acknowledge the relevance of materialism, economic gain, and market exchange, but insist on tying these with sets of motives and causal chains which return to the social.
C. Single Arena or Separate Spheres?
In my discussion of contract law, the promise of marriage served as a grey area bringing law's conceptual structures into focus. In this Section I turn to a grey moment in literature, again under the conviction that by observing liminal cases we learn a lot about a category of thinking, perhaps much more than we can learn by observing its paradigmatic core, its easy cases.
The following discussion clarifies in what sense The Way We Live Now grounds discontinuous, strictly separate spheres, despite its forceful representations of a single-arena world.
In The Way We Live Now, the terms of trade are portrayed through a story of a public railway company, used by Melmotte and the American Fisker to raise public funding.
The railway plot is informed by the single-arena outlook. The text obscures the economic aspects of the story to which the reader is first introduced (no paid-up capital, a potentially unnecessary railway that may never be built, and questionable share allocations); these aspects become an unresolved question. The logic of railway share trade, having been obscured, is then Recall the opening quotation in which a financial concept changes its shape in parliament.
The absence of a pure economic logic here becomes an issue, a thing considered more consciously as absence. This awareness turns absence into presence. Whether the absence is to be regretted or not is less important than making it a fact to be noticed. In ideological terms, this is a moment that should be captured when we seek to understand how a separate-spheres consciousness becomes so convincing; how a text representing nothing but the single arena contains a grain which could become a source of meaning, as it was in Victorian legal discourse, and as it has remained for historians of the era.
IV. CONTRACT LAW, NOVELS, AND JOINT LIBERAL ANXIETIES
In grey areas the differences between separate spheres in law, and single arena in novels, are blurred. From these grey moments one can turn to central commonalities between the outlooks of nineteenth-century contract law and novels.
Both the legal tendency towards separate-spheres, and the novelistic tendency towards a single-arena consciousness, have this in common: an anxious need to make sense of the social division of labor -of a functionally differentiated capitalist world. 57 Both separate spheres grounded in contract law, and the single arena grounded in novels, assume and take for granted that society is made up of multiple and varied functional domains, important among them the economic; that humans go through life, and in fact through everyday, by moving among those domains; and that to make sense of human experience the meaning and relations of domains to one another must be reckoned with. Functional differentiation, in other words, is both assumed as a fact and attributed normative importance under the two outlooks: separate spheres and single arena.
One need only return to familiar stories of the rise of modern society, to Weber 58 or Durkheim, 59 to see that the imagination of society through functional differentiation is a major conceptual lens through which to capture a capitalist world. Indeed, the need to make sense of functional differentiation -to explain and shape the relations between domains of human existence, is an elementary part of liberalism of whatever variety; we might view this as the minimal commitment on the basis of which we can begin to articulate varieties of the kind explored in this paper.
Why is attention to functional differentiation so important for liberal thought? For at least two reasons. First, liberalism, in every variety, is a world-view in which human existence is normatively ordered by imagining not just individuals, but the relations between individuals and society, coupled with an assumption that individuals' relation to society are multifaceted and variable, rather than holistic and predetermined. The latter assumption requires that society be imagined as varied, and in ways which do not import status-like determinations of individual positions. Reckoning with functional differentiation is part of the process of imagining a society on such terms. Second, and related to the first point, the emphasis on multifaceted relations of individuals to society historically required a normative shift toward the affirmation of ordinary life. 60 Reckoning with functional differentiations in society is part of the emphasis on the everyday and the ordinary. Wuthering Heights undermines separate-spheres thinking, it is because the novel radically defamiliarizes the ideology's basic structure of thought, namely, the idea of a functionallydifferentiated world. To take the Heights as a representation of the home or private sphere, one must assume such a differentiated world. Wuthering Heights resists precisely this idea. The unfamiliar quality of the novel, the darkness surrounding its tale, is achieved through the estrangement of the social as an all-encompassing reality. The text relegates the social idea to a distant, threatening position, and with it the idea of functional differentiation.
How is functional differentiation estranged in Wuthering Heights? Diversity of human activity is kept at a minimum, with scanty or no description, and at an irreducible distance from the novel's scenes. Wuthering Heights does not think about the home as one sphere in a more complex world; it denies the relevance and bans discourse concerning other activities, while turning the home into an entire world. Characters in Wuthering Heights live with a view inwards -into the house as a consuming interest and sole reality, rather than outwards -from the house towards an ever-expanding vision of a diversified social world, as characters do in many other novels. Social diversity, and functional differentiation, are simply irrelevant to the construction of the Heights' world.
Consider the figurative place of Gimmerton -a village in the vicinity of the two estates depicted in the novel. Gimmerton is represented as a site of diverse social activity: characters go there and back, transact business, obtain information, travel. And yet, Gimmerton is remote. Its irreducible conceptual distance -despite its nearby geographical one, is marked by the utter lack of description of the village. Accounts of landscape, both natural and man-made, are central in
Wuthering Heights, but Gimmerton is never allowed to enter through the concretizing visual sensory so integral to the novel.
Representations of commerce remain aloof throughout Wuthering Heights with the rest of the social idea. It is only at the close of the novel, when the social narrator of the taleLockwood, gains the upper-hand, that we suddenly encounter explicit imagery of commercial dealings with the social world, represented in the servant Joseph's "dirty bank notes" (305), 63 and finally a gold coin contemptuously thrown at his feet by Lockwood. Up to this point, transactions sealed by social institutions, despite their centrality to the plot (think of Heathcliff's property rights), had been inner-looking both in terms of characters and subject matter, centered on the Heights and Grange and their residents, and kept the idea of the "busy world" (247) at bay.
There is no functional multiplicity in the world of the Heights from which we might begin to think of continuous or discontinuous spheres of action. This estrangement of the social division of labor serves as a reminder of its ubiquity elsewhere, in contract law as in many Victorian novels.
* * *
The assumption of, and anxiety about, functional differentiation, is part of contract law's and novels' liberalism, their joint acceptance of specific attributes of the world as central for sensemaking processes in which they both engaged.
Law and novels' common liberalism, focused on the capitalist division of labor, has been fundamental enough to drive historical analyses, which have perfected the common focus into a separate-spheres argument, with too little attempt to tell apart the two conceptual commitments involved here: the commitment to make sense of the capitalist division of labor was not necessarily a commitment to separate spheres. While in law the two commitments were entangled, in novels the focus on the division of labor emerged in a single-arena outlook. This outlook was not an opposition to liberalism, but a different way of answering its key questions; a different way of putting liberalism to work. The centrality of functional differentiation, with its emphasis on the everyday and the ordinary, on multiplicity and variability, should not obscure the varieties of liberalism which could, and did, arise from it.
CONCLUSION
The overall picture of nineteenth-century law and novels is one of joint (liberal) questions, and different (liberal) answers. Law and novels both sought ways to represent the capitalist division of labor, to make sense of, and render central, the functional differentiation between commerce, family, religious practice, politics and other domains, none of which alone could dominate human experience, each of which was felt to have a place, diminishing or expanding, in a new world in which individual existence was the focal point, and was to be conceptualized without metaphysics or birth rights, through relational formulations vis-à-vis a varied social. Readings of common ideological currents in law and literature, like readings of oppositional stances toward hegemonic ideologies, risk wronging historical insight on two levels.
First, they risk telling only half the story about law, literature and the relation between them, underplaying either important differences between historical discourses, or important commonalities.
Second, and more importantly, both poles of the polarized framework of analysis in fact serve a single historical narrative: that of ideology, particularly classical liberalism, as a single essential entity, which one could either support or oppose. But liberalism was in fact a variety.
One can safely speculate that, if asked, interdisciplinary historians would identify differences or commonalities between Victorian law and literature (or other liberal discourses)
existing at the margins of their accounts, which could be given more consideration (whether of the variety explored in this paper, or otherwise). Why, then, have these been kept at the margins?
The forces driving polarized analyses are multi-faceted. I note three kinds as a manner of opening up further discussion. One has to do with the anxieties of interdisciplinarity; another with the salience of diachronic developments; a third with the attraction of binarisms.
The polarized framework of historical analyses seems to emerge, at least partly, from a A second effect of diachronic change is backward-looking and implicates, it seems, primarily stories of commonality. Law and literature analyses are at once synchronic and diachronic. They engage Victorian discourses vis-à-vis one another on a synchronic plane, but also engage both vis-à-vis a past. An assumed common past (say, the feudal world, the ancien` regime of credit etc.) functions as a touchstone against which the synchronic plane is illuminated.
A felt break with the past in both law and literature thus underwrites the story of commonality, of a new liberal hegemony. Read against the past, the nuance of synchronic difference, especially difference falling short of ideological antagonism, gets lost.
Finally, the single arena is, metaphorically, a picture of all spheres painted grey, rather than black and white. The single arena outlook accepts functional differentiations -it is a single arena, not a single sphere; at the same time, however, this outlook blurs the boundaries of spheres, represents actors in the market and elsewhere as persons embedded in relational settings, and converges the meaning of experience around common social concerns. The single arena, unlike a separate-spheres outlook, does not fall neatly into binaries informing western thought, between emotionality and rationality, between other-and self-regarding, between social and economic ties, or what have you. Not only are we used to binaries; they are also attractive for the conceptual clarity they enable. It is just possible, therefore, that we intuitively seek to make sense of the world through binaries. My argument, however, is that binarism comes with a price; it deflects understanding as well as critique.
The picture of nineteenth-century liberal thought was more complex than current accounts suggest; it requires letting go of some binarisms, and acknowledging a history of a varieties of liberalism.
The varieties of liberalism account is not an assertion of complexity for its own sake.
Complexity is not, in itself, a normative end of historical analysis (though it is very often how it ends). But complexity can have normative content beyond basic historical accuracy. The point is not that there was opposition to separate-spheres thinking, but more simply, and fundamentally, that liberal thought did not commit to it.
Most broadly, the critical impulse behind much interdisciplinary work is often not simply the object of critique (as, here, classical liberalism), but the borders of disciplinarity itself. In legal studies, the object is often a reopening of legal stories through an engagement with disregarded discourses like literature. 65 But, if the readings emerging from such reopening end up either polarizing discourses or denying the differences which emerge from historical disciplinary boundaries, they undermine the kinds of complications promised by interdisciplinarity. 70-71 (1996) (arguing that specialization of disciplines was barely underway in mid nineteenth century, and that overlaps indicated and enabled board conceptual continuities in explanations of various aspects of the environment).
objectivism is a practice of interpretation which, when theorized, falls back on the language and logic of the will theory which it arose to strengthen. See HORWITZ, supra, at 35-39. On the legal construction of the market through a prudence of distrust see UNGER, supra note 6, at 66. 30 Berns, supra note 12, at 43; John V. Orth, Contract and the Common Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 44, 52 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998) ("the contract of marriage carries the parties, as it were, to the threshold of their new status, but not beyond"). For an expansive account of models of marriage in the Anglo-American tradition see JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997). Witte argues that the contractarian model of the Enlightenment, in which marriage was in essence a voluntary bargain whose terms were set by the parties themselves, was adumbrated in the eighteenth century, elaborated theoretically in the nineteenth, but implemented legally only in the twentieth century. The model could not transform the law of the nineteenth century, though it induced greater protections for wives and children. Id. at 10, 194-215. 31 Finn describes the regime, finally abolished with full contractual capacity given to married women only in the interwar years. FINN, supra note 12, at 265-66, 325. See also Berns, supra note 12, for the history of the doctrine. 32 Anson made the logic explicit when he excluded from treatment transactions which were "not such as we ordinarily term Contracts." Among these were "[a]greements which affect a change of status immediately upon the expression of the consent of the parties, such as marriage, which, when consent is expressed before a competent authority, alters at once the legal relations of the parties in many ways. (2010). Note that Steinbach does not deny the gender bias of the action for breach of promise. In fact, her analysis turns on gender and class no less than those of Lettmaier or Frost. Instead, Steinbach argues that women were able to bring and win suits in large numbers due to the influence of contract (and sentiment). 37 For a detailed account of the competing and complementing frameworks involved in conceptualizing the promise of marriage -those of affection, contract, and status (primarily gender and class), see Anat Rosenberg, The Promise of Marriage: Liberalism on the Defense (under review). 38 Frost distinguishes between the economic and gender aspects of the action, arguing that courts were biased towards women as opposed to men plaintiffs. My suggestion is that this bias is inseparable from the economic meanings attached to the marriage contract, rather than external or different from them. For Frost's distinction between economic meanings and gender-bias see FROST, supra note 36, conclusion. 39 Id. 40 The "fall" of classical thought in law is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that in the nineteenth century encroachments of contract, today habitually seen as the rise of "social law," did not have significant effect on the legal version of sphere separations, and were conceptualized as indeed encroachments, or interventions -in which the public interferes with the private. Counterprinciples, if you will. 41 RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE ENGLISH NOVEL FROM DICKENS TO LAWRENCE 11 (1971) . 42 IAN WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL 63-64 (1957) . 43 See, e.g., FRANCO MORETTI, THE WAY OF THE WORLD (2000) (discussing the English novel's tendency, together with law, to legitimate the established order); DANIEL COTTOM, SOCIAL FIGURES (1987) (arguing that the realist novel was one of the major forms of the rational representation of a universal order which was in fact a projection of the newly dominant English middle class); LEO 
